Most Highlanders will know of the crossing of the Lamone River in December of 1944 as one of The Regiment’s finest combat achievements. Indeed, the crossing of the Lamone resulted in the award of The Regiment’s Lamone Crossing battle honour. As well, the Regiment’s commencing officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacKenzie, was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his leadership during the crossing. The operation has become a textbook example of a successful opposed river crossing.
The crossing of the Lamone was an important task faced by Allied Forces in northern Italy in late 1944. After successive German defensive lines, including the Hitler Line and the Gothic Line, had been breached by Allied Forces, the German commander in Italy, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, adopted a strategy of delaying the Allied Forces’ northward advance by defending each of the rivers which flowed in a northeast direction towards the Adriatic Sea. The Lamone, which runs for about 88 km from the Appennino Tosco-Emiliano mountains to the Adriatic, was a critical element in Kesselring’s defensive strategy. The Lamone River was a particularly significant barrier to the Allied Forces in December of 1944 due to heavy rains which had resulted in a swollen river, steep and muddy banks, and well-prepared German defensive firing positions which offered excellent observation of attacking forces and which had established preregistered artillery and machine gun fields of fire.
The Regiment’s crossing of the Lamone occurred just south of the hamlet of Boncellino, about 65 km southeast of Bologna. Today, the site of the Lamone Crossing is surrounded by carefully manicured vineyards and well-tended fields and orchards. Not so much in December of 1944. Here is the entry in The Regiment’s war diary describing the nighttime crossing and the subsequent day’s bridgehead consolidation efforts:
11 December 1944
Place: ITALY, SHEET 1/50,000 100 III MR 416346
Weather – Cloudy with a slight frost

1943. This sketch map was prepared after the War by Brig-Gen E. Haldenby,
who commanded The Regiment from September 1939 to August 1940.
Shortly after midnight “C” Coy was reported across the LAMONE and “A” Coy had reached LIPITS(411350), “B” Coy was on GORODETS (414352) and reported hearing an SP gun moving toward them from the north. The gun ran down the road right through the coy position and apparently turned around and came back up. By this time Capt LEADBEATER’S men were ready for it and it was fired on and hit by a PIAT bomb which failed to stop it immediately and the gun disappeared up the road. At 0200 hrs Brig BERNATCHEZ came up to TAC. He seemed pleased with the progress of the brigade and arranged then to pass one coy of the WNSR [i.e., the West Nova Scotia Regiment – Ed.] through our bn, followed later by 2 coys of the R 22é R. On it being reported to him that the P.W. Interrogation had revealed the location of a Bn HQ and 3 SP guns at 403356, the Brigadier himself arranged to have medium guns shell the area, following which a red flame was seen which was believed to be one of the guns burning. At 0300 hrs 2 of our Mk III boats were sunk by shell fire, but despite this loss, the one coy of the WNSR was clear of our crossing site, and “D” Coy was ordered to prepare to cross and move to 409357 – at the time “B” Coy had reached SECTION (412355) and sent its extra platoon to “A” Coy at LIPITS (411350). By 0500 hrs the confusion of the initial crossing had died down and the coys having formed up in the bridgehead, sent guides to 415352 to bring up the 2 pdr anti-tank guns, or Little Johns as they were known, which had crossed on a Mk 5 FBE bridge built by the R.C.E. At 0600 hrs “C” Coy having taken up firm positions at 414353 and 414351 was ordered to move forward to the left of “B” Coy to area 406360. At the same time, the original plan of the coys was altered and Capt MURDOCH was ordered to move his men into the position vacated by Capt MCCUTCHEON. By 0730 hrs move was well under way with “D” Coy in position and “C” Coy at SECTION (411355) and moving towards its final objective. At 0830 hrs a Class II Raft was functioning and the Little Johns were carried across. “C” Coy had reached 40953580 and “B” Coy was ordered to move to 405355 – “A” Coy and “D” Coy were remaining firm at 411350 and 414351 respectively. Some difficulty was experienced in getting the 2 pdrs over the river, and although one was ditched, by 2000 hrs “C” Coy had 2 of the Little Johns in the Coy area. The raft site was under constant shell and mortar fire making the operation so difficult that eventually it ceased. During the remainder of the morning there was little change in the bn area. By 1400 hrs “A” Coy was advancing cautiously beyond LIPITS (411350), “B” Coy was in area SECTION (412355) and moving toward 406355. “C” Coy was also on the move to a point beyond SECTION at 407358. “D” Coy was still firm at the rd jc 414353. At 1440 hrs Brigade ordered that the bn clear up the line of the railway to the power line at 408363. The WNSR were to cross in part of “C” Coy and clear along the road to SINGLE (403362) while the R 22è R went to DUKORA (404375). However, before the plan could be put into effect it was changed , and instead, “A” Coy was ordered to push on to BONCELLINO 401343, and “B” Coy was ordered to take CASA LUGATTI 399349, leaving “C” Coy standing fast at 407356. The WNSR were at the same time to pass one coy through “C” Coy to SINGLE (403362) where it would consolidate, and a second coy was to go to the rd jc OCTAGON (399356) and firm there. “D” Coy would then move to area LIPITS (411350). At 2100 hrs Lt-Col MACKENZIE moved TAC across the Lamone to 411350 with Major PROCTOR as Battle Adjt. At this time Major BANTON remained behind and later returned to “X” area. The area was very quiet with sporadic fire to the south and heavy Arty barrages on the 5th Corps front. Capt. W.G.BURKE-ROBERTSON and the Signal Officer remained behind to maintain the Rear TAC HQ. As a result of working under comd 3 CIB great stress was laid on line comm. It was decided that wherever possible not only would TAC be on line to Bde, but the Rifle Coys would be in telephone communication with TAC. This somewhat radical change in policy meant considerable work for the Sigs pl who were kept continually busy maintaining lines across the river to TAC and beyond to “A” Coy which was the only coy at that time that had line. Another casualty due to sickness in this operation was the Medical Officer Capt MacINTOSH who had only recently succeeded Capt CANTELON. He had held off an attack of jaundice to the last possible moment, but was forced to go out eventually and Capt POLLACK took over as RMO in the midst of the crossing of the LAMONE.
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